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ABSTRACT 
 
Reflecting on the myriad instances where juridical recognition demands a story, 
confession, testimony on suffering, or evidence of trauma – this essay considers 
the role of storytelling and narrative in constituting the legal person, their 
persona, and relationship they have to a community or the state. What are the 
forces that drive the demand to give an account of oneself? What are the reasons 
for, and implications of, resisting the injunction to reveal all? Going beyond the 
usual bounds of juridically recognized testimony and evidence – I consider how 
memory moves across time and space in human and non-human material 
formations. These questions are posed to open discussion of a wider concern 
about the autonomy and heteronomy of law. Looking beyond the separation of law 
and morality in positivist jurisprudence – the autonomy/heteronomy distinction 
is a means of getting at the co-constitution of the human and non-human. The 
discussion thus ranges across the philosophies of history that constitute 
autonomy/heteronomy – examining the tension between confidential stories of 
those who have suffered abuse, and the state’s archival drive to preserve such 
material; literary and metaphorical devices for narrating the past; and a 
consideration of nature and destruction where the human plays an infinitesimal 
part in making history. 
 
KEYWORDS: autonomy; heteronomy; legal person; A-G of Canada v Larry Fontaine 
[2017] 2 S.C.R 206; colonial violence; slavery; philosophy of history; Walter 
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My mother told me,  
they’ll want you to tell them your story, the girl said.  
My mother said, don’t. You are not anyone’s story. 
 





In this essay I explore the legal and political means by which experiences of 
trauma are received, dissimulated, and archived by juridical institutions. These 
archival processes are a means of constituting and regulating the legal person. 
What are the forces that demand speech, writing, and the recording of individual 
testimony?  What are the different ways of evading archival enterprises that force 
the traumatized to speak? In addressing these questions I explore the conceptual 
and literary devices that help the past to be accessed without demanding more 
from the wounded or the dead.ii 
 
Constituting the legal person through stories and narratives discloses a wider 
problem, as I will go on to explain, manifesting the tension between autonomy and 
heteronomy in law.  To be autonomous is to give oneself one’s own law by one’s 
own means. Giving oneself law also involves telling a story – for instance, the 
biography of a legal subject who asserts autonomy in the face of competing 
structures of governance and authority. Autonomy, the self-authorized auto-
nomos of law (ipseity), is a conceit that applies to the individual and the state alike. 
Autonomy is often instantiated through elaborate tales assembled and reiterated 
over time – an impersonation of independence practiced by individuals and the 
state. iii  In contrast to the legal fiction of the autonomous individual or state, 
heteronomous accounts of a person, class, and community open to another law -  
the law as other, law as coming from another place. Hetero-nomic law is the law 
of the other, law as history, memory, and various theological understandings of 
the source of authority and authorization. In a formulation that I will extend in this 
essay, Marx proclaimed that ‘people make their own history but not under 
conditions of their own choosing’ (Marx, 1852).iv These haunting conditions of 
human and non-human existence undo any pretense to absolute autonomy 
asserted by the individual or state. Indeed, a history that places the individual and 
the state to one side may be encountered in transhistorical mytho-poetic 
narratives (Motha, 2018, 143-51), and in what W.G Sebald termed a ‘natural 
history of destruction’ (Sebald, 2004).  Perhaps too ambitiously, then, this essay 
attempts to recast the fictive constitution of the legal person and the 
autonomy/heteronomy of law as an archival problem.  
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The Greek etymological root of person is persona. It connotes a theatrical mask 
which manifests the ‘duality’ of a façade separated from that which is behind it; 
and a ‘duplicity’ that enables actors to interpret their role differently from one 
performance to another (Esposito, 2015, 30). The category of ‘person’ may apply 
to humans, non-humans such as corporations, and is being extended to other 
inanimate phenomena such as rivers and forests. A person may be cast as inside, 
outside, or liminal to sociality depending on the juridical recognition they receive. 
Carrying these multiple meanings of separation and ruse, the legal person is an 
ambivalent construct. While some would regard this flexibility and malleability of 
the ‘person’ as a welcome addition to the ‘toolkit’ of legal techniques – this fluidity 
has facilitated distinctions that were central to the institution of slavery (Hartman, 
1997); and has enabled the artifice of the corporation to shield individuals from 
responsibility for taxes and many other forms of social and economic harm 
(Bakan, 2005).   In this essay I seek to de-center juridical personification as a mode 
of recognition by extending narrative and archival encounters to non-human 
material. Thus my objective is not to extend instances of the legal person, but to 
open new registers for recalling and encountering human and non-human 
histories of the present. 
 
At a relatively benign level, giving an account of oneself creates a subject and 
category of legal person through autobiography. But stories are also aligned to 
various identities and structures of governance and are often demanded in 
testimonial and evidentiary processes of the law. Citizen, subject, native, woman, 
refugee, or non-binary trans figures are framed by stories in political and juridical 
modes of recognition. Raced and gendered beings are invited to share their 
experiences of discrimination so institutions can clean up their act and comply 
with regimes regulating equality. Refugees and displaced persons are regularly 
forced to testify to their suffering and abject lives. Their scars and wounds are 
asked to speak as a precursor to state recognition of their legal status as persons 
with a well-founded fear of persecution (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009, Ch 9 & 10). 
That the conditions of fear are not always written on the body, or that recounting 
trauma does its own damage, are concerns set aside in legal and bureaucratic 
processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice and reconciliation have had 
testimony of victims and perpetrators at the heart of their processes. Similarly, 
survivors of violence in colonial reservations and residential schools are asked to 
disclose the details of sexual abuse in order to have these recognized by truth 
commissions or to qualify for compensation (Kennedy, 2001; and Kennedy, 2011). 
In other instances, courts and tribunals that adjudicate on native title litigation 
and indigenous land claims are having their storerooms reconstituted as national 
archives (Genovese, Luker & Rubenstein, 2019). These multiple demands to 
disclose, preserve, and disseminate testimony manifest an archival drive that 
assembles and constitutes the legal person and their communities. However, these 
practices of recognition privilege human-centered narratives, and they place an 
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undue burden on those who have experienced violence to recount their 
experiences. As we will see, the conditions under which testimony on violence is 
archived risks instrumentalizing accounts of trauma to serve the reconciliation 
projects of nations and societies. In this context building encounters with non-
human archival sites and objects such as ships, oceans, minerals (Sharpe, 2016); 
and processes of transformation in animal and plant populations in landscapes of 
destruction (Sebald, 2004), may build new configurations and experiences of 
violence. 
 
This essay is part of a wider project to promote a less human-centered 
jurisprudence. One task associated with this is to chart transhistorical formations 
and material manifestations of violence where the human is only one part of being 
lawful and subject to legal mediation in the world. I begin with a discussion of A-G 
of Canada v Larry Fontaine [2017]. This case involved the terms and conditions of 
archiving and giving public access to the confidential evidence of survivors of 
sexual abuse and other violence in Indian Residential Schools in Canada. The 
litigation manifests the tensions and contradictions of juridical recognition of 
historical abuse and violence. Here the constitution of the subjectivity and 
experience of individuals come into conflict with what are projected as the 
interests of communities and states seeking to reconcile their future with a violent 
past. I deploy the Fontaine case to highlight the archival orientations of liberal 
legal institutions which promote autonomous subjectivities while at the same 
time projecting national and social institutions as heteronomous determinants of 
the uses of historical narratives.  A far richer approach to archiving historical 
violence can be found, I suggest, in the wake-work undertaken by Christina Sharpe 
on slavery and the shippability of bodies. In this vein I also discuss the post-human 
accounts and encounters of the German writer W. G Sebald in his treatment of the 
reluctance and reticence of Germans to address their experience of the fire-
bombing and destruction of cities and populations during WWII. He provides yet 
another instance of an archive constituted by an assemblage of objects, animals, 
and plants. Sebald also offers insights into the return of sociality that happens 
despite, and even by the repression of, destruction.  The phenomenology of objects 
and nature that Sharpe and Sebald respectively offer stand in stark contrast to 
what I suggest is the central conceptual architecture of modern jurisprudence: the 
distinction between autonomy and heteronomy where the autonomous subject is 
set apart from heteronomous institutions of law.  
 
This essay, as I have already stated, is a preparatory moment in what is a much 
larger task of expanding what is understood to be the heteronomy of law. Moving 
beyond the law/morality dichotomy set up by much liberal jurisprudence, I chart 
the richer history of ideas on heteronomy as a means of inaugurating a post-
human archive of violence. 
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INDIVIDUAL STORIES AND COLLECTIVE MEMORIES 
 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court recently decided an application brought by 
survivors of sexual and other abuse in Indian residential Schools who wished to 
have the confidentiality of their testimony respected and protected. They had 
given evidence to the Independent Assessment Process (IAP) (A-G of Canada v. 
Larry Fontaine, 2017). The IAP arose out of the Indian Residential Schools 
Settlement Agreement (2006) (IRSSA), enabling survivors of violence and abuse in 
residential schools to settle a class action seeking compensation. The Chief 
Adjudicator of the Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat had 
requested directions from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that the IAP 
documents be subjected to a 15 year retention period during which claimants 
could elect to have them preserved and archived. If such consent was not 
forthcoming in that period, the records would be destroyed. These orders and 
directions were granted.  
 
In response, the Attorney-General of Canada and other parties including the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the National Centre for Truth and 
Reconciliation (NCTR) argued on appeal that the IAP documents – documents that 
disclosed sensitive accounts of sexual abuse, recordings of testimony, transcripts 
and electronic files - are “under the control of a government institution” (IAP), and 
thus subject to preservation under the Access to Information Act, the Privacy Act, 
and the Library and Archives of Canada Act. A further concern of the state of 
Canada was that the destruction of testimony would diminish its capacity to 
defend itself in potential future litigation. Archiving evidence in this case was thus 
a means of future-proofing the state of Canada. The A-G of Canada, TRC, and NCTR 
were also seeking to preserve a historical record for a state mandated form of 
commemoration and memorialisation – an archival imperative that exists in 
tension with the privacy promised to those subject to abuse in residential schools 
when they agreed to participate in the IAP process.  
 
The Court dealt with the tension between national commemoration and the 
‘conscription’ of the survivors of abuse in the following way:   
The position taken by the TRC, and later by the NCTR, that these documents 
should be transferred to the National Archives and eventually shared with 
the NCTR, would defeat the principle of voluntariness underlying the IAP. 
Irrespective of the claimants’ intentions or wishes, their stories — which, 
it bears reiterating, include accounts of abuse ranging from the monstrous 
to the humiliating, and of harms ranging from the devastating to the 
debilitating — would in time be disclosed to the NCTR (and, by extension, 
to the public), to be applied to its project of commemorating and 
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memorializing the residential schools system. In other words, highly 
sensitive and private experiences would be conscripted to serve the 
cause of public education. But this is plainly not what the parties 
bargained for. We agree with the majority at the Court of Appeal that “the 
IRSSA put the survivors, not Canada and not anyone else, in control of their 
own stories” (Fontaine, 244). (Emphasis added) 
The National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations at the time of the IRSSA’s 
negotiation testified that strict confidentiality of the IAP was intended as part of 
the agreement so that “nobody except the survivor would have access to the story 
of the survivor” (Affidavit of Larry Philip Fontaine, 2017, 233-34). This view was 
supported by other IAP claimants “who tendered affidavits attesting to their 
understanding that information disclosed within the IAP would not be shared 
outside of that process” (A-G of Canada v. Larry Fontaine, 234.). Some of the sexual 
violence and abuse was committed by student-on-student in the residential 
schools. An added concern, therefore, was the potential for retaliatory violence 
and discord within First Nations communities if privacy and confidentiality was 
not preserved. The survivors’ disclosure of abuse, and obtaining the cooperation 
of religious organisations that administered residential schools, were greatly 
aided by strict confidentiality.  
 
Where the stories of abuse and violence are part of a colonial history of genocide 
and dispossession - a plurality of subjects, institutions, and times make claim to 
the narratives. In this way individual testimonies call forth a heterogeneity of time 
and memory. To the extent that a story is produced in the context of judicial 
proceedings or quasi-juridical inquiries – a legal persona is called forth and 
constituted by the law. It is also interesting to note the language of a ‘bargain’ in 
the Fontaine judgment. Part of what is at stake in cases such as this is the 
possibility of renewing a social contract or creating respectful sociality for the first 
time. 
 
Larry Fontaine’s assertion that “nobody except the survivor would have access to 
the story of the survivor” expresses a determination to maintain a story as 
stubbornly singular; a secret not to be shared beyond the purpose and context of 
its original disclosure. On the other hand, national institutions charged with 
developing ‘collective knowledge’ and assembling the ‘historical record’ assert 
imperatives that project an archival future beyond the ‘raw wounds’ of the 
individual survivor. Thus, the NCTR was concerned that the destruction of IAP 
documents would: 
deny future generations . . . the collective knowledge and history essential 
to healing” (R.F., at para. 119). In its view, we are not now in a position to 
know how important the IAP Documents may be to “future healing”, since 
the concerns over the potential negative ramifications of disclosure were 
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expressed at a time when the wounds inflicted by residential schools are 
still “raw” (transcript, at pp. 59-60). (Fontaine, 245) 
What bearing does ‘future healing’ have on the rawness of today’s wounds? On 
first blush it seems eminently sensible that the Supreme Court of Canada 
dismissed the claims of the NCTR and refused to allow survivors to be 
“conscripted” to serve the priorities of ‘healing’ future generations. It permitted 
the applicants to control the preservation or destruction of their stories, and left 
them to deal with their wounds as they wished. But is this all there is to this 
complex question of who owns a story? 
 
A-G of Canada v. Larry Fontaine signals a tension between the individual agency of 
survivors and the archival demands of communities and nation-states. In addition 
to avoiding the harms that would be compounded if confidentiality were not 
maintained, there is an important aspect of the autonomy and dignity of the 
survivor associated with controlling their own story. The consent to make the 
story accessible through an archive is theirs to give or refuse. However, this is only 
one part of the picture as communities, families, and kinship structures may assert 
that the experience of one member be deemed to be that of a wider group or 
collective.v What, then, is to be done with testimonies of trauma and evidence of 
violation? My suggestion is that thinking about the conceptual regimes and 
histories of legal person can assist in addressing this question. This inquiry also 
opens to the wider problem of the tension between the autonomy/heteronomy of 
law. 
 
The mode of telling a story has transformed in fundamental ways in the age of 
mechanical reproduction and the rise of digital communication technologies. 
Walter Benjamin was already charting and lamenting these transformations in 
1936 when he wrote “The Storyteller” (Benjamin, 1999, 83-107).vi For Benjamin, 
the stories told by the ‘resident tiller of the soil’ and the ‘trading seaman’ drew on 
their ‘experience’ to recount tales and legends that contained the wisdom of 
traditions and people they had encountered (Benjamin, 1999, 84). This era of 
storytelling came to an end most drastically with WWI when the human body 
came in to contact with the destructive machinery of a total capitalist war. The 
stories told of this war and the biographies that it produced were full of 
'information‘ rather than the mutually constituted narratives of the erstwhile 
storyteller whose enigmatic tales were delivered face-to-face with the listener. A 
generation that travelled to school, the farm, or the mine in a horse-drawn cart 
would encounter massive technological transformations which included the 
mechanically reproduced means of conveying the story (Benjamin, 1999a). vii 
Benjamin also comments on the solitary narrator who emerges with the novelist 
who has “isolated himself” (Benjamin, 1999, 87). With the novel comes the 
“solitary individual, who is no longer able to express himself by giving examples 
of his most important concerns, is himself uncounseled, and cannot counsel 
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others” (“Benjamin, 1999, 87). To write a novel “means to carry the 
incommensurable to extremes in the representation of human life” (Benjamin, 
1999,  87). Benjamin methodologically countered these developments through the 
use of the ‘dialectical image’ as means by which past and present are juxtaposed 
so that knowledge can reveal itself in a ‘flash’; where the past is not sublated and 
subsumed by what supersedes it, but returns to reveal its coexistence with the 
present.  
 
Benjamin projects an Eurocentric romanticism about the era before WWI in an 
account that pays no attention to the destruction visited on indigenous 
communities around the world by rapacious imperial expansion from the 16th 
century onwards. Nonetheless, his attention to the conditions of storytelling, and 
especially the vernacular mode of oral transmission compared to the 
technologically mediated forms of disseminating stories, dramatizes 
transformations in the mode of communicating ethical and political problems. 
Moving from the localized individual sharing a story face-to-face, to the recording 
and dissemination of narratives to serve ‘public education’ opens questions about 
the relation between autonomous and heteronomous forms of existence.viii 
 
Larry Fontaine’s imperative to curtail access to the survivor’s story seeks to 
preserve a circumscribed instance of telling a highly sensitive story. Defending the 
original conditions of storytelling involves asserting the autonomy of the agent 
that consented to tell the story for one purpose and no other. Fontaine challenges 
the machinations and machinery of nation-building archives as adequate reason 
for appropriating the individual survivor’s story. Preserving the confidentiality of 
the survivor is one way of holding the exigencies of socio-national encroachment 
at bay.  The demand by the Canadian Government and truth and reconciliation 
institutions for access to Fontaine’s and other survivors’ stories manifests the 
tenets of historicity – the sense that the story comes from a discrete time and 
place, and that it can be preserved and passed on as collective memory. History is 
then the accessibility of a particular experience ‘back then’ that can be preserved, 
retrieved, and reproduced for the instrumental purpose of ‘public education’ and 
for healing future generations. The future is placed in a linear and teleological 
relationship with the past. This linear temporality of historicity says: ‘your story 
is too raw for you to make sense of now; but we will know what to do with it in 
the future’. Benjamin usefully points out how the incommensurability of the 
individual story, which he impugns with reference to the novelist, can make its 
own way into the future. It will ‘jut’ into the future-present and be exposed in a 
‘flash’.  
 
The legal contest in the Fontaine case manifests an opposition of wider juridical 
and political significance: that between autonomy and heteronomy.  In one sense 
Fontaine involved the autonomy of subjects(s) asserting the confidentiality of 
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their story and the uses to which they may be put. This can be contrasted with the 
heteronomic demand of state archives and institutions of reconciliation which 
asserted that these stories are a social memory that should be preserved and 
accessible for future use. In what follows I will begin to explore a more complex 
relationship between historical events and collective memory; and the relation 
between history, politics, and the psychic life of individuals.  
 
 
LIVING IN THE WAKE 
 
An approach that overcomes the autonomic orientation of law and legal technique 
can be found in Christina Sharpe’s In the Wake:  On Blackness and Being (Sharpe, 
2016). Sharpe begins in a biographical register, giving an account of deaths in her 
own family and the experience of being black in the United States (Sharpe, 2016, 
Ch 1). While that seems to repeat the autonomic orientations of modernity, she 
surpasses that in exploring the conditions under which black people live and die.  
To be black is to live with the impunity with which black lives are killed in 
increasing numbers today; deaths that reverberate around black families and 
communities, and increasingly across the world through movements such as Black 
Lives Matter. According to Sharpe, to be black is to live in a continuous wake, and 
to live in the time of the shippability of black bodies. Sharpe deploys the notion of 
the wake in multiple ways: that which comes after; the trace left on the water’s 
surface by a ship; and a disturbance caused by a body moving through air or water 
(Sharpe, 2016, 3). The wake is also about a condition of wakefulness, of 
consciousness (Sharpe, 2016, 4). 
 
Sharpe turns the notion of ‘wake’ into a historical method. It is an approach that 
combs the archive of whom and what cannot directly testify regarding itself, but 
is present all around – such as the legal techniques of maritime insurance that are 
derived from the transportation of slave ‘cargo’.ix  This expands the archive to 
include the non-human, materiality, and legal processes and practices. The bodies 
that remain shippable, and the ledgers that record the trade in humans, open 
questions such as: 
Is Ship a reminder and/or remainder of the Middle Passage, of the 
difference between life and death? Of those other Haitians in crisis 
sometimes called boat people? Or is Ship a reminder and/or remainder of 
the ongoing migrant and refugee crises unfolding in the Mediterranean Sea 
and the Indian and Atlantic Oceans? (Sharpe, 2016, 46) 
This attention to the ship, legal techniques, waters, oceans and objects – still 
graspable and reachable in the present - produces a sensuous immediacy that 
retrieves a past that is manifested in the present. To that extent Sharpe’s 
deployment of the ‘wake’ contains a philosophy of history. This philosophy of 
history involves deploying the wake as a metaphor. As Hannah Arendt said of 
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Walter Benjamin’s thought – he deployed metaphor to get as near as possible to 
the real:  
For a metaphor establishes a connection which is sensually perceived in its 
immediacy and requires no interpretation, while an allegory ... must be 
explained before it can become meaningful, a solution must be found to the 
riddle it presents … . (Arendt, 1968, 19).  
Metaphor has the ability to convey meaning without further explanation. The 
sensuous immediacy of the ship invokes the afterlife of slavery.  
 
Along with the ‘wake’, Sharpe deploys the ‘Trans*’ as a concept, notation, and 
metaphor to open a route to thinking the ‘unthought’ black body:  
So I’ve been thinking about shippability and containerization and what is 
in excess of those states. What I am therefore calling the Trans*Atlantic is 
that s/place, condition, or process that appears alongside and in relation to 
the Black Atlantic but also in excess of its currents. I want to think Trans* 
in a variety of ways that try to get at something about or toward the range 
of trans*formations enacted on and by Black bodies. The asterisk after a 
word functions as the wildcard, and I am thinking the trans* in that way; 
as a means to mark the ways the slave and the Black occupy what Saidiya 
Hartman calls the “position of the unthought” (Hartman and Wilderson 
2003). The asterisk after the prefix “trans” holds the place open for 
thinking (from and into that position) (Sharpe, 2016, 30).  
The notion of Trans*, just like wake, has different meanings that it can invoke 
today (on gender, transatlantic slavery, shippability), but at the same time retain 
the character of being an ‘afterlife’ of the ‘unthought’. The Asterisked Human 
(Trans*) is a way of opening up heteronomy in our thinking. That which is 
seemingly erased and unthought returns through this signification which is in 
sensuous contact with the shippability of human ‘cargo’ in the Mediterranean and 
other seas and oceans today. This heteronomous hold of the past on the present is 
the other law that determines humans and non-humans. 
 
 It is important, for my purposes, to emphasize the contrast between the 
constitution of autonomous subjects through auto-biographic narratives, and the 
multivalence of heteronomous accounts that connect humans to their mineral, 
material, and juridical antecedents. Living in the wake involves an attentiveness 
to multiple remainders and to what endures in time (see also, Baraitser, 2017, Ch. 
5). Moving the emphasis from autonomy to heteronomous co-determinants of 
existence can remove the need to instrumentalize individual trauma and 
experience as we observed in the Fontaine case. Individual evidence and 
testimony is then one among many registers for encountering the past. 
 
In the Wake: On Blackness and Being recovers traces of meaning from 
speechless beings. In doing so, Sharpe enacts what Shoshana Felman, following 
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Benjamin, called a “speechless connection between history and trauma” (Felman, 
2002, 33). Speechlessness, as Felman points out, “remains out of the record”. As 
we observed in Fontaine, the archival record may be silenced precisely because of 
the scale of the trauma, or the acuteness of the suffering. Erasing the archive may 
be a means of respective the wishes of the survivors who must not be forced to 
speak beyond the terms of their address. But this is far from a suspension of 
history: 
History (to sum up) is thus inhabited by a historical unconscious related to 
– and founded on – a double silence: the silence of “the tradition of the 
oppressed”, who are by definition deprived of voice and whose story (or 
whose narrative perspective) is always systematically reduced to silence; 
and the silence of official history  - or victor’s history – with respect to the 
tradition of the oppressed. According to Benjamin, the hidden theoretical 
centrality of this double silence defines historiography as such (Felman, 
2002, 34).  
The raw wound of the survivor – the event of silence - may then be seen as a 
historiographical event. The pressing question is what ‘meaning’ may be drawn 
from this event of silence. Sharpe’s attentiveness to the non-human traces of 
historical events provides access to the heteronomous determinants of the 
present. 
 
What would it mean for an archive to preserve and access silence at the 
same time? This is a question that is often posed in the context of literature, and 
Derek Attridge offers an insight to it that enables us to return to the sensuous 
immediacy of metaphor, or to put it another way, what it would mean to dwell in 
the event of singularity and alterity presented in literature (Attridge, 2005). He 
draws a distinction between literary and allegorical readings, recognising that all 
readings involve an element of familiarity with the genre, and the ways in which 
meanings can be derived from a shared experience of culture, and indeed from 
one’s own personal history and experience. He goes on to add:  
At the same time, I respond emotionally to these meanings as I engage with 
my own stores of knowledge and memory. In some reading experiences 
however there seems to be more to what happens: I register a strangeness, 
a newness, a singularity, an inventiveness, an alterity in what I read. When 
this happens I have two choices (putting a complicated matter very 
crudely): I can deploy reading techniques that will lessen or annul the 
experience of singularity and alterity – and this will usually involve turning 
the event into an object of some kind (such as a structure of signification) 
– or I can seek to preserve the event as an event, to sustain and prolong the 
experience of otherness, to resist the temptation to close down the 
uncertain meanings and feelings that are being evoked. In both cases I am 
concerned with “meaning”, but in the first case I understand it as a noun, in 
the second as a verb. I can, one might say live the text that I read. This is 
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what I mean by a literal reading.  […] an equally apt term for literal reading, 
in this sense, is literary reading (Attridge, 2005, 40). 
 Attridge’s position “Against Allegory” considers J.M. Coetzee’s novels Waiting for 
the Barbarians and Life & Times of Michael K. While he agrees that there can be 
important and instructive allegorical readings of these novels, his argument is that 
these texts place reading allegorically itself into question. In a similar way I have 
been exploring how the archive, including destruction of what may constitute the 
archive (in the Fontaine case), needs to be read as an event that puts the archive 
into question. 
 
DESTRUCTION AS ARCHIVE  
 
 The destruction of the archive may also be considered in the context of a 
history or tradition of such destructions. W.G Sebald explored this history and 
tradition in his reflections on the relative silence of German writers, chroniclers, 
and novelists in tackling the suffering of Germans during WWII (Sebald, 2004). In 
“Air War and Literature: Zürich Lectures”, Sebald opens a consideration of a 
relatively unthought trauma - the bombing unleashed by the Allied Powers on 
German cities such as Dresden, Hamburg, Frankfurt am Main, and Halberstadt 
(Sebald, 2004, 3-105). Indeed, the refusal by Germans to address their 
victimisation and collective uprooting from homes and cities was turned into 
apparent virtues of restlessness, energy, insensibility, and a craving for travel 
(Sebald, 2004, 12, 34). The catalyst for German economic dominance is: 
the stream of psychic energy that has not dried up to this day, and which 
has its source in the well-kept secret of the corpses built into the 
foundations of our state, a secret that bound all Germans together in the 
postwar years, and indeed still binds them, more closely than any positive 
goal such as the realization of democracy ever could (Sebald, 2004, 13).  
The project of creating a greater Europe is one that has failed twice, and Sebald 
warns that it is worth remembering the wider context of repressed memory as 
Europe expands and the influence of the Deutschmark “seems to extend almost 
precisely to the confines of the area occupied by the Wehrmacht in the year 1941” 
(Sebald, 2004, 13).  
 
Sebald’s approach to the silence about German suffering during the total 
destruction of the Air War is to open what he terms a ‘natural history’ of 
destruction, addressing the limits of an ‘open book’ of human history, and the 
deficiencies of materialist epistemologies. The perception, after Marx, was that the 
history of industry (and we may add capitalism) is “how the “history of industry 
and the now objective existence of industry have become the open book of the 
human consciousness, human psychology perceived in sensory terms” (Sebald, 
2004, 1-18).x In contrast, Sebald asks: 
Can materialist epistemology or any other such theory be maintained in the 
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face of such destruction? Is the destruction not, rather, irrefutable proof 
that the catastrophes which develop, so to speak, in our hands and seem to 
break out suddenly are a kind of experiment, anticipating the point at 
which we shall drop out of what we have thought for so long to be our 
autonomous history and back into the history of nature? (Sebald, 2004, 66) 
Interrupting the autonomous history of humans in the context of the bombing of 
German cities involved observing how quickly their natural order changed. There 
was an immediate increase in the number of “parasitical creatures thriving on the 
unburied bodies” (Sebald, 2004, 34). Rats and flies “frolicked in the streets” – an 
“image of the multiplication of species that are usually supressed in every possible 
way is a rare documentary record of life in a ravaged city” (Sebald, 2004, 35). You 
could also “tell the date of a building’s destruction from the plants growing among 
the ruins” (Sebald, 2004,  39). It is not only the flora and fauna that feature in this 
natural history of destruction. Sebald points to and reproduces photographs of the 
tattered footwear worn by Germans which show the degradation in concrete 
terms. There is also another phenomenon that Sebald terms ‘natural’ – the 
remarkable speed with which ‘social life’ returns: “people’s ability to forget what 
they do not want to know, to overlook what is before their eyes, was seldom put 
to the test better than in Germany at that time. The population decided – out of 
sheer panic at first – to carry on as if nothing had happened” (Sebald, 2004, 41).   
   
The phenomenology of nature and natural history deployed by Sebald requires 
further attention and research. He was gripped by vertiginous visions as he 
wandered between the dead-ends of amnesia and melancholia.  The proliferating 
‘new materialisms’ have already opened productive paths into the nature of 
matter (Coole & Frost, 2010). This new materialist thinking has displaced human-
centred ontologies and promoted the vibrancy and enchantment of objects. We 
now need a philosophy of history that reorients modern accounts of nature, 




THE AUTONOMY AND HETERONOMY OF LEGAL PERSONS 
 
 
Who or what is proper to a place is cast through fictions. Legal personality is one 
such fictive form that determines whether bodies are distinguished from things 
and assigned a legally mediated place in the world. The assurances of legal 
personification are tenuous and fluid. Slaves in 19th Century U.S law, for example, 
were cast as both persons and things. A slave could be person-enough to be held 
criminally responsible if they committed homicide, but at the same time be a thing 
that could be used, abused, and traded (Hartman, 1997, Ch 3).  
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The primacy of persons, although more longstanding in legal history, is sharpened 
by modern accounts of autonomy. Indeed, from Hobbes to the contemporary legal 
positivists, the autonomy of the individual and the autonomy of the legal system 
have mirrored each other. The autonomy of law, for theorists who assert it, is a 
projection of the autonomy of the individual subject. The assumption of individual 
autonomy is the underlying connection that unites liberal political philosophy and 
legal positivism. One way to challenge this underlying unity of liberalism and 
positivism is to interrogate the figure of the autonomous person. I propose we do 
this by understanding law through the tension between autonomy and 
heteronomy. The contrasting accounts that undergird autonomy and heteronomy 
open legal analysis to a historical register, and to a set of concerns about what it 
means to represent, receive, and hear stories from the past as the heteronomous 
determinants of law.   
 
Autonomy and heteronomy are two dominant forms of giving an account of the 
legal person and of law. They are emblematic terms in a narratives of what law is. 
Autonomy – for a state, institution, or person – denotes the capacity to give oneself 
one’s own law by one’s own means, to be independent, to be by and for oneself. 
Heteronomy is necessarily more wide-ranging, with the hetero (other, different), 
denoting the presence of an external or different law: of myth, extraneous forces, 
drives, legal institutions, and history. Both terms (autonomy and heteronomy) sit 
in tension with each other, and manifest philosophical contestations about what 
law is. 
 
Characterizing laws, persons, or political formations through the register of 
autonomy/heteronomy has a long trajectory. As Neil MacCormick explained in an 
influential essay reflecting on these terms in the debates among legal positivists: 
“autonomy and heteronomy are understood to be primarily qualities of 
human beings as moral and practical agents, either conforming to norms 
that they will for themselves … [autonomy] ... or to norms that others will 
for them … [heteronomy]. This is historically the original sense of the 
terms, but it is no longer the only, or perhaps even the most, common sense 
ascribed to the terms in contemporary discussions of law (MacCormick, 
1995, 69).xi 
MacCormick acknowledged that the Kantian notion of practical reason on which 
this characterization of ethics and morality rested is a controversial one. A 
contrasting approach would often pitch community and tradition as the source of 
values and virtue (MacCormick, 1995, 70). For legal positivists, nonetheless, 
morality and law, the individual’s moral decisions and institutional norms are 
distinct: 
Thus law and morality are conceptually distinct. Autonomous morality is 
autonomous. Law is not. They must be conceptually distinct. To 
summarize, law is institutional where morality is controversial and 
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personal; law is authoritative, settling questions by acts of authority, where 
morality is discursive, always open to fresh argument on equal terms by 
any interested participant in the discourse; finally, law is heteronomous, 
binding us from without, where morality is autonomous, binding us by our 
own reflective Judgement and will. Heteronomy is also a feature of 
professional ethics where that is delegated to professional corporations or 
their disciplinary tribunals or ethics committees for decision in problem 
cases. Professional ethics so understood is also institutional, authoritative, 
and heteronomous (MacCormick, 1999, 170-71). 
On this liberal account, autonomy is internal (morality) and heteronomy (law) is 
external to the individual. This mode of understanding autonomy/heteronomy, 
however, does not help us to determine whether the survivor’s story in Fontaine 
is either hers to will its preservation or destruction, or whether those interests 
must bow to the wider Canadian community’s archival future as represented by 
the A-G for Canada. On MacCormick’s account the decision of the Supreme Court 
is heteronomous. On the other hand, the fact that the Supreme Court in Fontaine 
decided to protect the confidentiality of individual stories can be understood as a 
re-enforcement of traditional liberal notions of individual autonomy, and 
protection of a ‘bargain’ about confidentiality between survivors and the state. 
However, it is not difficult to imagine a court making the opposite decision, where 
the perceived interests of the state persist over that of the individual. In such 
instances – and now moving away from MacCormick’s paradigm of 
autonomy/heteronomy - the communal memory may be understood as 
heteronomous to the interests of the individual. To cut what would need to be a 
longer analysis short, the account of autonomy/heteronomy offered by positivist 
jurisprudence – where morality is internal to the person, and law is external and 
thus heteronomous - offers limited assistance. 
 
Etienne Balibar helps to push the paradigm of autonomy/heteronomy beyond 
MacCormick’s liberal terms and limits (Balibar, 2002, 1-20). Working from the 
premise that ‘equal liberty’ stated in revolutionary terms has a logic that contains 
a ‘self-refutation of its negation’, Balibar argues that autonomy is only possible 
through the unfolding of a universalization of the claim to autonomy. For instance, 
in the Marxist tradition the demand for emancipation was articulated through the 
universalisation ‘the people of the people’, the ‘universal class’. The politics of 
autonomy which is first a negation of oppressive conditions, must then present as 
a ‘negation of the negation’, thus becoming an absolute. Famously, Marx gave an 
account of subjects’ agency as ‘politics under conditions not of their choosing’. For 
Marx, writing in the “Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, “human beings 
make there own history, but they do not make it arbitrarily in conditions chosen 
by themselves, but in conditions always already given and inherited from the past” 
(Marx cited in Balibar, 2002, 8). Balibar offers a persuasive account of the agency 
of the individual subject that can be derived from the ‘conditions of history’ as the 
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heteronomous condition of the individual subject’s agency and politics. History as 
heteronomy – ‘the conditions not of their choosing’ for Marx – must then sit 
alongside, or provide the backdrop to the claim to autonomy based on the 
negation of its opposite. What is ‘given and inherited from the past’ has its own 
conditions of emergence. Putting this contingent inheritance - which is not always 
accessible or self-evident - into question is central to the history work of law.  
 
The social and structural contingency of autonomy must also be understood in 
terms of the psychic life of the individual. Freud associated autonomy with 
consciousness (the Ego) and heteronomy with the unconscious (the Id) 
(Castoriadis, 1987, 102). The Id as the “origin and place of drives (‘instincts’)” are 
not “pure’, however (Castoriadis, 1987, 102). What is at issue, Castoriadis argues, 
is the “interminable, phantasmatic, and fantastic alchemy” of the unconscious 
forces of “formation and repression, the super-ego and the unconscious Self” 
(Castoriadis, 1987,  102). Here the autonomy represented in the self-legislation of 
the conscious ego is opposed to the heteronomy of another – that is, the 
“legislation and regulation by another” - but another that is “in me” (Castoriadis, 
1987, 102). The alienation that arises from the tension between autonomy and 
heteronomy within the individual is mirrored in the social world: 
Beyond the ‘discourse of the other’ lies that which gives it its unshiftable 
weight, limiting and rendering almost futile all individual autonomy. This 
is manifested as a mass of conditions of privation and oppression, as a 
solidified global, material and institutional structure of the economy, of 
power and of ideology, as induction, mystification, manipulation and 
violence. No individual autonomy can overcome the consequences of this 
state of affairs, can cancel the effects on our life of the oppressive structure 
of the society in which we live.  (Castoriadis, 1987, 109) 
Castoriadis is primarily a thinker of autonomy and sought an autonomous society. 
However, combining the psychoanalytic account with the socio-structural, 
Castoriadis offered a far richer analysis of the relation between 
autonomy/heteronomy than the positivist jurisprudence of MacCormick. 
 
As we have seen, there are different approaches to understanding the legal person 
through the varied accounts of autonomy/heteronomy: a) as an isolated moral 
agent both hemmed in and enabled by external legal norms (MacCormick, 1999); 
b) a revolutionary agent of history (Marx/Balibar, 2002); or, c) a subject divided 
from within (Castoriadis, 1987). I tend towards an individual subject as agent of 
moral judgment, but always under conditions and through registers and 
normative frameworks not of their choosing. Additionally, this subject often acts 
for reasons and motivations that are opaque to their own self – driven as they are 
by unconscious and contingent drives and circumstances. In other words, 
autonomy is always folded in with heteronomy. 
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This account of the autonomy/heteronomy of the subject needs to be 
distinguished from the multivalency of the legal person in Roman law.   Drawn 
from the Greek origins of persona (prosōpon, meaning dramatic mask), the 
original meaning of ‘person’ as a masked being enables a multiplication of the 
presence of the individual subject. Mussawir and Parsley explain how Roman Law 
received this Greek notion and developed a set of very functional techniques in 
relation to the person (Mussawir & Parsley, 2017, 44). These functional 
techniques, legal fictions, and technical devices enabled various aspects of social 
and economic life. For example, Roman law could deploy a variety of fictions to 
treat slaves as property, on the one hand, but with the capacity to be distinguished 
from their status as a thing for particular purposes. With these techniques and 
fictions a slave could make a contractual promise on behalf of their owner. As 
Mussawir and Parsley elaborate, a slave can be jointly owned, but be distinguished 
through a legal fiction in order to be capable of making a contractual promise 
enforceable between the same joint owners. There is a presumed functional 
neutrality and technical ‘purity’ in their treatment of Roman law. They argue that 
the technicity of the Roman law of persons has been adulterated and 
contaminated by notions of sociological context, power relations, and 
metaphysical ideas about the person. They impugn this politically driven search 
for the ‘concrete person’.  Mussawir and Parsley argue that we are losing 
something if we let go of the technical formations that Roman Law enabled. In 
what way might the fact that these techniques enabled the institution of slavery 
matter for the purposes of our discussion?   
 
The argument Mussawir and Parsley make, drawing on Yan Thomas and Alain 
Pottage, is that the fictional malleability of the person was highly enabling, and 
that this has been lost as the person has become imbued with transcendental and 
moral concerns as an ethical or natural subject. Roman Law was able to 
‘fictionalise biology’ (Alain Pottage) and allowed different kinds of transactional 
personae that were invented for the purposes of a transaction. For Mussawir and 
Parsley, the modern person is too readily equated with a natural subject, when in 
fact it may be a corporation, a river, or stretch of land. This fictional attribution of 
personhood to a wide variety of animate and inanimate forms is part of the legal 
functionality enabled by the techniques of Roman Law: 
Roman jurisprudence gives an important priority to the technical register in 
which it fashions its ‘persons’, and that register doesn’t … have any necessary 
hold on the psychic life of individuals or on the ontological structure of the 
human being’ (Mussawir and Parsley, 2017, 50-51) 
This is an endorsement of rivers and other non-human formations being granted 
legal personality; a potential advantage in a legal framework where such 
personality is an a priori condition of legal recognition.  
 
However, a legal technique is not merely a technical form or device.   My 
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contention is that this line of argument repeats the gestures usually found in 
positivist discourses on legal autonomy where affective dimensions are 
marginalized in favor of formal rationality. As Saidiya Hartman has put it: 
In the arena of affect, the body was no less vulnerable to the demands and 
the excesses of power. The bestowal that granted the slave a circumscribed 
and fragmented identity as person in turn shrouded the violence of such a 
beneficent and humane gesture. Bluntly stated, the violence of subjection 
concealed and extended itself through the outstretched hand of legislated 
concern. The slave was considered a subject only insofar as he was 
criminal(ized), wounded body, or mortified flesh. This construction of the 
subject seems rather at odds with a proclaimed concern for the "total 
person” (Hartman, 1997, 94).  
Of course the technical functionality of a malleable notion of the ‘person’ may be 
deployed to support politically progressive determinations from trans-gender 
identities, recognition of indigenous laws and customs, and protecting the 
environment. But we also know that it has been deployed to sustain the institution 
of slavery. A law of persons must, therefore, be considered in relation to the 
psychic life of humans and the ontological conditions of human and non-human 
beings. The autonomy of legal technique needs to be considered in relation to the 
heteronomy of psychic life (Castoriadis, 1987); subjects making history in 
‘conditions not of their choosing’ (Marx/Balibar, 2002); and the ‘universalisation 





In the preceding discussion we have seen that the autonomy of legal persons, and 
the heteronomic determinations that constitute them have been given varied 
accounts in liberal, positivist, Marxist, and post-Marxist accounts. We have 
considered just some of these in the context of the Fontaine case which sharply 
posed the tension between the autonomy that is constituted in and through the 
conditions under which a story is told and shared, and the wider archival and 
social demands that are made on that narrative. A subject already split from within 
faces the prospect of being externally divided by accounts that reenact the 
separation thesis of positivist jurisprudence – that is, that there is one internal will 
and morality, and another external level of authority and legitimation. Displacing 
this implausible bifurcation, we have considered accounts of persons that chart an 
alternative philosophy of history that moves through the ‘wake’ – an approach 
suggested by Sharpe as a method to open narrative forms that decenter the human 
in historical accounts. This analysis is consistent with the recent strands of new-
materialist thinking and attention to affect in legal studies. We have also observed 
– through the work of Sebald - that destruction may curate its own archive. The 
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conceptual framework of autonomy/heteronomy that I have set out here offers a 
theoretical orientation for this new archival work to take place.  
 
Undoing the privileges and conceits which assert that autonomy emanates from, 
and is solely located within the human subject is an urgent priority. In this essay I 
have identified this to be an archival problem that can be addressed by opening 
heteronomic accounts of human and non-human phenomena. My suggestion is 
that an expansion of the category of ‘person’ to non-humans as we have observed 
recently with respect to rivers and forests is not the answer to growing 
environmental catastrophes. Appreciating the co-constitution of life and non-life, 
as Elisabeth Povinelli has argued, is one way to address the privileged status of 
the former over the latter (Povinelli, 2016). At a normative level, heteronomic 
formations understood through multiple archives must be brought to bear on a 
range of legal problems from colonial violence to environmental catastrophe. 
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iProfessor of Law, Birkbeck, University of London. I would like to thank Carson Arthur, 
Peter Goodrich, and Stephanie Jones for comments on earlier drafts. A conversation with 
Trish Luker helped to orient aspects of this inquiry. All errors are mine. 
ii See Shoshana Felman’s discussion of Claude Lanzmann’s epic, Shoah. Lanzmann 
describes Shoah as something other than a historical film about the holocaust, and 
characterizes it as an “incarnation” and a “resurrection”. In the film a historian, Hilberg, 
reads the diary of a Jewish leader of the Warsaw Ghetto, Czerniakow, who committed 
suicide. The diary is read to Dr Grassler, the former Nazi commissioner of the Warsaw 
Ghetto. Felman claims that the role of the historian here is “less to narrate the history” 
but rather to “embody, to give flesh and blood to, the dead author of the diary”. This 
incarnation and resurrection is worth bearing in mind as a distinct register of what it 
means for the dead to speak: Shoshan Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History. (New York: Routledge, 1992). pp. 
214-16.   
iii I am grateful to Peter Goodrich for drawing my attention to the person as 
‘impersonator’ which he pursues through the work of Esposito. I have dealt with the 
fictions and pretentions of the state through the notion of ‘as if’ in Archiving Sovereignty: 
Law, History, Violence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018).  
iv “Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does 
not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at 
hand”, Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonarparte [1852] (2008) (New 
York: Cosimo Classics). 1. 
v My thanks to Rebecca Johnson of the University of Victoria, B.C., for pointing this out to 
me when the first draft of this paper was presented at the Interrupting the Legal Person 
Symposium, 26th June, 2019. 
vi Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Work of Nicolai Leskov” in 
Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Pimlico, Random House, 1999). 83-107. 
vii See Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, in 
Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Pimlico, Random House, 1999). 211.  
viii I expand on this point below. 
ix Sharpe discusses the The Zong Massacre of 1781 which is recorded in Gregson v Gilbert 
(1783) – the court case on insurance for jettisoned “cargo”: ‘The Zong was first brought 
to the awareness of the larger British public through the newspaper reports that the 
ship’s owners (Gregson) were suing the underwriters (Gilbert) for the insurance value 
of those 132 (or 140 or 142) murdered Africans. Insurance claims are part of what 
Katherine McKittrick calls the “mathematics of black life” (McKittrick 2014), which 
includes that killability, that throwing overboard. “Captain Luke Collingwood thus 
brutally converted an uninsurable loss (general mortality) into general average loss, a 
sacrifice of parts of a cargo for the benefit of the whole” (Armstrong 2010, 173)’. In the 
Wake, 35. 
x Sebald quoting Alexander Kluge, in Neue Geschuchten, Hefte 1-18,  “Unheimlichkeit der 
Zeit” (Frankfurt an Main, 1977), Kluge’s emphasis. 102 in “Air War and Destruction”, 66. 
xi Neil MacCormick, “The Relative Heteronomy of Law” (1995) 3:1 European Journal of 
Philosophy 69-85 at 69. See also, Neil MacCormick, “The Concept of Law and The Concept 
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